NKE Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpont Nézőpontok 2018

Kaleab T. Sigatu: The role of regional actors in the South Sudan conflict

The members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), including Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, and Sudan, form a regional complex with interlinked regional security concerns. Neighbouring countries like Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda have played a crucial role in supporting South Sudan’s struggle for independence and its subsequent political and security developments. Fighting erupted in South Sudan in 2013 between the forces of President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar, quickly descending into violence along ethnic lines. The struggle for power in South Sudan is not only political but also driven by ethnic tensions between the Dinka and Nuer groups. Other communities, such as the Murle and Equatorians, have also been involved in the conflict. Negotiations to resolve the conflict were mediated by various international actors, including IGAD, the African Union, the United Nations, China, the EU, the US, and Norway. Different countries in the region had their own strategic interests and competed for leadership roles in the peace process, leading to tensions between Ethiopia and Kenya, and later between Uganda and Sudan. Ethiopia has invested heavily in the security sector in South Sudan, with more than 4,000 troops deployed in the UNISFA mission in Abyei. Kenya maintains strong ties with the South Sudanese government and opposition officials, who consider Nairobi a safe haven. Sudan is interested in maintaining its dominance in South Sudan and resisting Uganda’s interference. In addition, Sudan has historically supported South Sudan’s opposition forces and may continue to do so, while also providing sanctuary within its borders. Uganda has been the only country in the region willing to undertake direct military intervention in South Sudan. The Troika countries (US, UK, Norway) had a critical role behind the peace talks in South Sudan and were concerned about the potential for prolonged conflict, destabilizing the broader region as well.

Full article: 2018/8.

Luca Puddu: China’s Development Assistance in sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges and Opportunities

China’s development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa has attracted large attention from scholars and the media as well. Beijing’s principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of recipient countries is particularly appreciated by African governments, but is also a matter of concern for Western donors and human rights activists who support the democratization of the African continent. One of the main shortfalls of the contemporary debate on China’s development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa lay in the fact that Chinese aid is often analysed interchangeably with other flows of financial assistance at commercial terms, thereby hindering a proper understanding of the rationale behind the foreign aid policy of the new Asian superpower. It is not clear whether Chinese foreign aid is driven by political logics or by the more mundane objective of opening new markets for Chinese firms overseas. Nevertheless, existing evidence suggests that Bejing’s development assistance is similar to Western development assistance in so far as it is aimed at raising diplomatic consensus in favour of China’s national interest at international fora. Concerning the impact of Chinese aid on African countries, it has been argued that the lack of conditionality fosters corruption and authoritarian rule. At the same time, however, it should not be underestimated that the rise of China as a donor superpower has positive consequences on the degree of African sovereignty vis-s-vis financial institutions and commercial banks. The challenge posed by the rise of China as a major donor of sub-Saharan Africa has shaped the behaviour of traditional Western donors, which are increasingly inclined to apply strict conditionality on their lending programs towards the African continent.

Full article: 2018/7. 

Antonio M. Morone: International Migration and Containment Policies: Lessons from Libya

Libya has often been seen as a transit country, despite the objective fact that most migrants remained in Libya to work. Italian–Libyan bilateral relations were characterized by the restrictions Libya imposed over the migration flows, which Italy requited with its commitment to support the end of the international embargo on Libya and the country’s readmission to the international community. After the fall of Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi in 2011, Italy and Europe have continued to exert a series of direct and indirect pressures on the new Libyan authorities with the aim of reaffirming the policies of migratory containment. Constant political instability and the persistence of conflict in Libya compromised the effectiveness of international containment policies and urged further extension of these policies to other African countries to the South of Libya. What containment policies have given rise to, as effectively as contradictorily, has been the flow of irregular migration.

Full article: 2018/6.

Cyprian Aleksander Kozera: Climate Change and Violent Conflicts – Towards Establishing a Connection. Studies from Rapa Nui and East Africa

Rapa Nui, or Eastern Island, is an isolated tiny piece of land in the Pacific, known for its stone carved statues erected between 11th and 17th centuries, A.D. The remote island was inhabited by up to fifteen thousand people. The construction abruptly stopped, marking the end of cultural development of the island-dwellers, most probably due to deforestation, following soil erosion and conflicts over scarce resources. At the time of the European arrival to the island in 1722, the island counted less than three thousand people and lacked high-tree forests. The decline of the island culture and environment might have been anthropogenic (started by the deforestation) or climate-related (e.g. droughts brought by El Niño – Southern Oscillation), or both as demographic pressure on the environment (e.g. total eradication of the high woodland and plants necessary for producing ropes and canoes), might have made subsequent environmental degradation much easier. The case of Rapa Nui shows how vulnerable human societies are to the degrading environmental conditions and how environmental depletion may lead to conflicts due to the scarcity of resources.

According to IPCC forecasts, climate change causes significant changes in weather patterns with more extreme climate events, thus creating not only warmer but harsher and less predictable climate conditions, to which accommodation will be more difficult. If global temperatures rise by 3°C to 4°C from the pre-industrial level (by now the temperature has already increased by 0.8°C), extreme weather events will become over ten times more common than in 2010. We will face major species extinction, environment forced mass migration, and conflicts over resources. Tackling global warming now would cost between two to three percent of the world’s GDP, but by the middle of the century its costs would rise to twenty percent of the world’s GDP.

In Africa “[c]limate change and climate variability have the potential to exacerbate or multiply existing threats to human security including food, health, and economic insecurity” – IPCC report states. Consequently, climate change is considered an important exacerbating variable of armed conflicts. The ongoing genocidal conflict in Darfur (Sudan) has been dubbed ‘the first climate war’. Examining the East African cases, we can observe an indirect, yet continuous and contiguous, relation between climate change and violence. Climate change and variability worsen livelihood conditions, what may increase migration and change pastoral mobility patterns, increase armed group recruitment, and increase risk of violent resource competition, leading to the outbreak of violence.

Our environment is significantly changing, and the change is imminent. The anthropogenic climate-related environmental changes cause tensions among peoples and exacerbate violent conflicts. One of East Africa’s worst tragedies in recent history, the genocide in Darfur, illustrates how a conflict, driven by a degrading environment can drastically escalate when brutally and mercilessly exploited by political elites. With continued global warming and rising demographic pressure, the conditions on the African continent will become harsher, desertification and deforestation will progress, soil erosion will follow, agriculture crops diminish, and thus the conflict potential will increase.

Full article: 2018/5. 

Hettyey András: Merkel után, AKK előtt: A CDU útkeresése

Cyprian Aleksander Kozera – Błażej Popławski: Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabaab – Similarities and Differences. Analysis of the Genesis, Evolution, and Strategies of the Islamist Violent Extremist Groups in Africa

Modern-day radical Islamists lay their ideological foundations on Salafism, a fundamental Islamic ideology. Salafism took roots in post-colonial Algeria among harsh economic conditions and general socio-political disappointment. The success of Mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan and return of numerous veterans from Central Asia was a catalyst for armed struggle in Algeria.

The civil war that erupted in Algeria in 1991, gave birth to many radical Islamist organisations, including GIA, later known as GSPC, the forefather of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). After the end of the Algerian civil war in 2002, AQIM spread beyond Algerian borders, encompassing with its illicit and criminal activities most of the Western Sahel, including e.g. Northern Mali. The beginning of 21st century, and especially the Malian conflict of 2012, exemplified deeper cooperation between various terrorist groups such as AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar Dine and possibly even Nigerian Boko Haram. Boko Haram was established as a radical but nonviolent religious sect in Northern Nigeria’s economically neglected state of Borno. Primarily, the group had a religious attire supported by a micro-lending system; Boko Haram was opposing Westernisation and aiming at implementing the Sharia law. After clashes with the police and the death of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, the group further radicalised and started a campaign of violence under new leadership of Abubakar Shekau. The group’s wide-ranging criminal and insurgency-like activities, resulting in 20,000 deaths and more than 2 million displaced, has caused a deep crisis in Nigeria and neighbouring states.

In Somalia, due to the failure of state institutions in the 1990s, radical Islamist groups took over power in the country. Presently, al-Shabaab remains the most active and dangerous Islamist terrorist group in Somalia, seriously crippling the state’s power, and threating neighbouring countries (inter alia Kenya).

Analysis of these three groups shows that they sprang from – real or perceived – inequalities and negligence of state institutions. Where injustice, deprivation and desperation reigns, violent extremist groups present themselves as a challenge to the status quo and a form of escape. Religious ideologies serve as a tool for social mobilisation and a façade to cover groups’ political and economic motivations and aims.

Full article: 2018/3.

Háda Béla: Árnyjáték – Észak-Korea játszmája az elszigeteltségből való kitörésért

Az élénk nemzetközi figyelemtől kísért 2018. június 12-i amerikai–észak-koreai csúcstalálkozó kissé ködösen megfogalmazott záródokumentuma már születésének napján komoly kritikákat váltott ki az elemzők többségéből. Jelen sorok szerzője azonban csak fenntartásokkal osztotta a pesszimizmust, sokkal inkább a megindult párbeszéd fejleszthetőségét és a realitások elfogadását emelte ki a folyamat interpretációjaként. Ezt mostanáig tartom, nem tagadható azonban, hogy a találkozó óta eltelt hónapokban nem történt komoly előrelépés a megállapodásban foglaltak végrehajtására, sőt, inkább a tárgyalások megakadását tapasztalhatjuk. Mindez joggal támaszt kételyeket a tekintetben, hogy valóban új korszak nyílt-e a két hírhedten ellenséges állam viszonyában. A tárgyalási folyamat jövője persze még bizonytalan, de a helyzet mindenképpen indokolja, hogy néhány gondolat erejéig foglalkozzunk annak hátterével és mozgatórugóival, elsősorban Észak-Korea szempontjaira összpontosítva.

Teljes cikk: 2018/2.

Kiss Máté Attila: Irak válaszúton – A 2018-as parlamenti választások értékelése

Több mint három hónap telt el a 2018. május 12-én megtartott iraki parlamenti választás óta, és a szavazatok újraszámlálása és az elhúzódó politikai egyeztetések ellenére sem alakult még meg az új kormány. Az iraki Legfelsőbb Bíróság augusztus 19-én ratifikálta a választások eredményét – ezzel elindítva azt a folyamatot, aminek 90 napon belül kormányalakítással kellene zárulnia. Azonban bármely leendő koalíciónak parlamenti többségre – a 329 képviselői helyből 165-re – van szüksége ahhoz, hogy kormányt tudjon alakítani, így a tárgyalások várhatóan (2014-hez hasonlóan ismét) nagyon el fognak húzódni. Az elemzés a választás előzményeit, eredményét és várható hatásait értékeli. Bemutatja, hogy az „Iszlám Állam” elleni küzdelem mellett milyen körülmények játszottak közre a választások megszervezésében és lebonyolításában, és áttekinti a fennálló iraki gazdasági és társadalmi problémákat, valamint értékeli a biztonsági helyzet változásait.

Teljes cikk: 2018/1.